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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
DOUGLAS E. JOHNSON, #85-A-0659,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2013-0242.70
INDEX # 2013-508
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner, NYS
Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision and ANDREA W. EVANS,
Chairwoman, NYS Board of Parole,
Respondents.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Douglas E. Johnson, verified on May 24, 2013 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on June 11, 2013. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the July 2012 determination denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on June 17, 2013 and has received and reviewed respondents’
Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on August 8, 2013 and
supported by the August 8, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General, as well as by the Affirmation of William B. Gannon, Assistant Counsel
to the New York State Board of Parole, dated July 9, 2013 (hereinafter the Gannon
Affirmation). The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply, sworn to on
August 16, 2013 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on September 4, 2013.
On January 22, 1985 petitioner was sentenced in Suffolk County Court to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life upon his convictions of the crimes
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of Murder 2° (three counts) and Rape 1°. Petitioner’s 1985 convictions/sentencings were
affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department. People v.
Johnson, 160 AD2d 813, lv den 76 NY2d 790. Petitioner made his initial appearance
before a Parole Board in November of 2008. Following that appearance a decision was
apparently rendered denying him discretionary release and directing that he be held for
an additional 24 months (next appearance presumably scheduled for November of 2010).
On July 21, 2010, however, petitioner committed a new criminal offense while in DOCCS
custody. On May 6, 2011 he was sentenced in Saratoga County Court, as a second felony
offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 1½ years to 3 years upon his conviction of the
crime of Attempted Promoting Prison Contraband 1°.
Petitioner made his first post-2011 conviction appearance before a Parole Board
(second appearance overall) on July 10, 2012. Following that appearance a decision was
issued again denying him discretionary release and directing that he be held for an
additional 24 months. The 2012 parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, YOUR
RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW. THE
BOARD HAS CONSIDERED YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT
INCLUDING DISCIPLINE AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, REQUIRED
STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED INCLUDING YOUR
RISK TO SOCIETY, REHABILITATION EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEED FOR
SUCCESSFUL RE-ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY. YOUR RELEASE
PLANS HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERED. MORE COMPELLING,
HOWEVER, IS THE EXTREME VIOLENCE AND DEVIANT CONDUCT
YOU EXHIBITED WHEN YOU MURDERED A VULNERABLE 15 YEAR
OLD GIRL. DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME YOU
STRANGLED THE VICTIM AND DROPPED A 64 POUND CONCRETE
BLOCK ON HER HEAD CRUSHING HER SKULL. YOU THEN SEXUALLY
ASSAULTED HER LIFELESS BODY. YOU CONTINUE TO DENY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS HENIOUS [sic] CRIME.
WHILE
INCARCERATED, YOU POSSESSED A WEAPON AND YOU WERE
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ULTIMATELY CONVICTED OF THE ADDITIONAL CRIME OF
ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE PRISON CONTRABAND 1ST. THE BOARD
NOTES YOUR COMPAS, RISK SCORES, YOUR PROGRAM, VOCATIONAL
AND EDUCATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE BOARD ALSO NOTES
YOUR LETTERS OF SUPPORT AND LETTERS FROM TRANSITIONAL
PROGRAMS. ALL FACTS CONSIDERED, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME
IS NOT APPROPRIATE.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the July 2012 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on December 28,
2012. The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within
the 4-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate while in the custody of the
department . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the
presentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement;
and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and
institutional confinement . . .”
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner argues, in effect, that the 2012 Parole Board unlawfully focused its
attention on the nature of the crimes underlying his ongoing incarceration, without
proper application of “new risk assessment guidelines” set forth in Executive Law §259c(4). That statute was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective
October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish
written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such written
procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of
persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon
release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates
may be released to parole supervision . . .” (Emphasis added).1 Since petitioner does not
specifically challenge the implementation procedures put into effect by the Board of

1

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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Parole in response to the amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), such potential issue
will not be addressed in this Decision and Judgment.
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the
July 10, 2012 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with respect to the appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s therapeutic and
vocational programming records, COMPAS risk and needs assessment instrument,
educational achievements, disciplinary record, release plans, community support and
criminal record in addition to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his
incarceration. See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. The Court, moreover, finds nothing
in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any
relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses
to its inquiries. In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole
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board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See McAllister v. New York State
Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d
1354. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crime underlying petitioner’s initial incarceration in DOCCS custody as well as his
additional, post-incarceration criminal conduct. See Gordon v. New York State Board
of Parole, 81 AD3d 1032, Gonzalez v. Chair, New York State Board of Parole, 72 AD3d
1368 and Marziale v. Alexander, 62 AD3d 1227.
Turning specifically to the COMPAS risk and needs assessment instrument, it is
noted that during the course of the July 10, 2012 parole interview one of the
commissioners stated “ . . . we have your COMPAS Reentry Risk Assessment Form. It
scores you as a low risk of felony violence and rearrest, very high though for prison
misconduct, and highly probable that you will have needs on the outside regarding
finances and vocational.” A copy of petitioner’s COMPAS risk assessment instrument is
included in the record of this proceeding as Exhibit E annexed to the Gannon Affirmation.
Although the Appellate Division, Third Department has determined that a risk and
needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with
post-September 30, 2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, ___AD3d
____, 2013 NY Slip Op 08189, Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067 and Garfield v. Evans,
108 AD3d 830), this Court finds nothing in such cases, or the amended statute, to suggest
that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of a risk and needs
assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the Board
of Parole to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in Executive
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Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole supervision.
In this regard it is noted that the “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated
pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure
the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would
succeed under community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members
of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision . . .” Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole
Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary
authority to determine whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody
to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the
COMPAS assessment and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent
assessment of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). See Partee v. Evans,
40 Misc 3d 896. In the case at bar the Parole Board ultimately concluded that a denial of
parole was warranted based upon the particularly heinous nature of the crime underlying
petitioner’s initial incarceration as well as the fact that petitioner, while in DOCCS
custody, committed a new, felony-level criminal offense after his initial 2008 Parole
Board appearance.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

December 11, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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